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Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he was the fifth consecutive British prime minister to occupy the position in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in two years – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for decades – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Essential context: ever since Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three opposing factions – the left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the following day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, due on Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look grim.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”